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The Israeli Defense Forces have recently released its comprehensive report detailing the events surrounding the October 7 assault by Hamas. This report marks a significant step in understanding how such a large-scale attack unfolded. While the inquiry began in November 2023, the outgoing IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, mandated further investigations across all units starting in March 2024. The IDF chose not to include recommendations in this document, deferring that responsibility to the incoming Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir.
The IDF assessment provides startling statistics on the scale of the assault. Estimates suggest that between 5,000 and 5,600 militants infiltrated Israeli territory during the offensive. Simultaneously, approximately 4,696 rockets and mortars were launched toward various targets in Israel. The deadly outcome saw 829 Israeli civilians, 76 foreign nationals, and 415 security personnel lose their lives, in addition to 251 individuals taken hostage and brought into Gaza.
According to IDF senior officials, a fundamental flaw in Israel’s defense was the misjudgment of Hamas’ intentions and its capability to execute a surprise attack. The planning for this assault began nearly seven years prior to the event, with foundational strategies laid out as early as November 2016. By July 2019, Hamas had approved its operational plan, which was ultimately set in motion in August 2021. The IDF identifies a specific timeline that reflects meticulous preparation by Hamas.
The IDF report explains that Hamas deliberated over various dates to execute the attack, including significant religious dates such as Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Ultimately, Hamas selected October 7, 2023, coinciding with Simchat Torah, a Jewish holiday marking the conclusion and restart of the Torah readings.
The attack commenced in the early hours of October 7, as Hamas initiated preparations around 11:00 p.m. on October 6. By 4:00 a.m., the forces had completed necessary briefings, demonstrating their readiness.
The decisive infiltration commenced at 6:29 a.m. with Hamas fighters breaching the security barrier between Gaza and Israel. By 6:43 a.m., the IDF had declared a state of emergency, followed by a formal response from the Israeli Air Force at 7:10 a.m. Within the first few hours of the attack, an alarming 3,400 militants had already infiltrated Israeli territory. Additionally, a significant call to action to Gaza’s civilians occurred just before 8:00 a.m., further complicating the IDF’s ability to manage the crisis.
Despite the IDF’s efforts to respond, many attacks continued throughout the day. By 1:00 p.m., some key operations had been halted, but numerous attackers remained active in Israeli territory into the evening. Although the IDF managed to reclaim certain areas by 9:00 p.m., the presence of hostile forces lingered late into the night, demonstrating the attack’s effectiveness and surprise.
The report indicates that prior to the October 7 assault, the IDF had primarily focused its resources on challenges posed by Iran and Hezbollah, perceiving Hamas as a secondary threat. This misjudgment resulted in a lack of preparedness for a significant escalation. The IDF believed Hamas was not inclined to pursue a full-scale conflict and underestimated the seriousness of their threat.
This inadvertently presented Hamas with an opportunity, as they took advantage of Israel’s perceived stability and security to orchestrate an unprecedented assault. The IDF cites a significant misconception where the primary threat was viewed as purely conventional, focusing on rockets and mortars launched from Gaza, leading to a failure to consider other possible avenues of attack.
In terms of intelligence, the IDF acknowledges a substantial gap in its ability to analyze the intentions and capabilities of Hamas. The Intelligence Directorate had been collecting relevant information since 2018 on Hamas’ strategies for a large-scale attack. However, this information was not effectively connected to the latest intelligence findings, resulting in a lack of actionable insights for senior decision-makers.
In the days leading up to October 7, intelligence signals suggested heightened activity from Hamas, including training drills. However, these alerts did not convey the urgency required to prompt a reassessment of the conditions in Gaza. The Directorate’s assumption that previous indicators of militant activity were negligible demonstrated a critical oversight.
Upon evaluation, the IDF concluded that its overall readiness for the magnitude of the October 7 assault was inadequate. While the Israeli Air Force had operational standards in place, these did not align with what would have been necessary for preparing against a surprise attack of this scale. The assessment also noted significant difficulties in distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants during the crisis, complicating operational responses.
As the IDF grapples with the implications of the attack, it acknowledges that reliance on historical intelligence may have hindered its ability to act decisively in thwarting unexpected threats. The words of IDF senior officials resonate in guiding future policies: a heightened focus on range of possible scenarios is imperative to avoid similar oversights. Ensuring accurate assessments and strategic planning will be essential to prevent a future recurrence of such an entrenched threat.
This report serves as a critical reminder of the complexities involved in military engagement and the importance of adaptive strategies in an ever-evolving security landscape. The IDF now emphasizes that a preventative strategy is vital for addressing potential threats, prioritizing proactive measures over reactive ones.