Supreme Court Ruling on USAID Spending Could Boost Trump’s Executive Authority

Opponents of President Donald Trump’s decision to freeze spending related to USAID may feel triumphant after the Supreme Court declined to intervene this week. However, the implications of the Justices’ ruling may not be as favorable for them as they hope. The Court’s decision has only allowed the continuation of a trial judge’s order to resume spending, marking merely a procedural skirmish in a far-reaching constitutional debate that will undoubtedly return to the Supreme Court. In the interim, Trump’s efforts to reinstate executive authority benefit from a foundation laid by the Constitution itself.

In the case of Department of State v. Aids Vaccine Advocacy Coalition, a D.C. federal trial judge mandated the administration to release approximately $2 billion to U.S.-based humanitarian organizations. Upon his inauguration, Trump enacted a 90-day freeze on foreign aid, intending to review the effectiveness and legitimacy of these grants to ensure they align with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. Judge Amir Ali, recently confirmed during President Joe Biden’s transitional phase, took the unconventional step of issuing a temporary restraining order that requires payments purportedly owed for services already rendered by these aid organizations.

When the federal appeals court struggled to decide whether to stay Judge Ali’s order, Chief Justice John Roberts stepped in, temporarily pausing the order last week. However, this hold proved fleeting, as a 5-4 majority of the Court chose to maintain Ali’s order. Remarkably, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Amy Coney Barrett aligned with Justices Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor, and Ketanji Brown Jackson in this decision, with no accompanying opinion, which often occurs in procedural matters.

Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh, issued a powerful dissent, contending that Judge Amir overstepped his authority by imposing the restraining order and mandating the executive branch to release these funds.

In his dissent, Alito dramatically questioned whether a single district-court judge, likely lacking jurisdiction, possesses the unchecked power to compel the U.S. government to disburse billions in taxpayer dollars. He emphasized his disbelief: “Does a single district court judge who likely lacks jurisdiction have the unchecked power to compel the Government of the United States to pay out (and probably lose forever) 2 billion taxpayer dollars? The answer should be an emphatic ‘No,’ but a majority of this Court seems to think otherwise. I am stunned.”

Alito’s dissent effectively critiques Judge Amir’s actions, suggesting a clear abuse of power in ordering the executive branch to continue payments. The rationale behind Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett’s votes could be that they want to observe how the case unfolds in lower courts before engaging in Supreme Court oversight.

The broader constitutional issue raised by this case is likely to return to the Supreme Court. Trump aims to rejuvenate the presidential authority to refuse spending funds in specific categories. One straightforward argument is that Congress cannot compel the president to utilize funds in ways that violate constitutional principles. For instance, Congress could not mandate the president to construct infrastructure projects employing only a specific demographic group.

A second critical area of concern linked to USAID is that Congress cannot coerce presidents into allocating funds that may compromise U.S. national security or foreign policy. The Constitution designates these critical areas of governance to the executive branch, a premise recognized by the courts.

Furthermore, Congress may not wield its funding powers to undermine the Constitution’s separation of powers. Historically, presidents have exercised the option to withhold funds when doing so supports constitutional governance. Thomas Jefferson, for example, declined to construct gunboats on the Mississippi River per Congressional orders, fearing such actions would ignite tensions with Napoleon, amid his negotiations for the purchase of Louisiana. Likewise, Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower regularly refused projects deemed unnecessary for national defense.

The third premise aligns with the idea that presidents maintain discretion to decrease spending to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. The Constitution tasks presidents alone with ensuring that laws are executed faithfully. This role may afford the president the latitude to comply with Congress’s funding directives while also saving money and adjusting to evolving circumstances. For example, if Congress allocates $100 million for a complicated dam project, yet engineering advancements allow the project’s completion for $50 million, the executive should be able to return the savings to the treasury.

Forcing presidents to squander funds and sustain subpar governmental operations denies citizens the very benefits intended through the presidency’s establishment. The framers designed the presidency to cultivate decisive, agile leadership, as outlined by Hamilton in Federalist No. 70. He articulated that a singular president would embody “energy in the executive,” an essential characteristic of effective governance. Leaders of the nascent nation understood the failures of committee-led governance during the Revolutionary War and sought to restore competent executive leadership.

In response to the Watergate scandal, Congress enacted the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, aimed at limiting presidential discretion over spending. This legislation requires presidents to expend all appropriations unless they receive Congressional approval. Congress dismissed decades of precedent going back to Jefferson and failed to recognize exceptions for unconstitutional spending or interference with national security. Although some assert that the Supreme Court’s decision in Train v. New York (1975) upheld this Act, that ruling addressed a distinct law where Congress demanded the EPA to allocate fixed amounts for water projects; the Court omitted any mention of the Impoundment Control Act.

Department of State v. Aids Vaccine Advocacy Coalition may evolve into the case that could ultimately clarify the constitutional impoundment debate. This case could intertwine with broader efforts to scrutinize Trump’s attempts to redefine executive power through workforce reductions, office closures, and decreased federal intervention in various sectors.

This aligns with Trump’s commitment to implementing unitary control over all executive agencies. Simultaneously, as legal challenges to the spending freeze progress in lower courts, Trump’s Justice Department is defending his authority to dismiss the leaders of certain “independent agencies” that exert significant influence over the economy and society.

The parameters of constitutional theory regarding impoundment and agency control stem from a common source. Unlike the Constitution’s detailed enumeration of Congressional powers, it does not explicitly outline the authorities vested in the executive. Narrow interpretations of Article II suggest that the president’s appointment power does not extend to terminating cabinet officials, only to appointing them with Senate advice and consent. The Constitution fails to distinctly authorize the president to dictate foreign policy or safeguard national security.

However, the founders intended to empower the president with the authority to oversee the executive branch and enforce laws while upholding national interests. Alexander Hamilton articulated the “unitary executive” theory in the context of the debate surrounding George Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, which kept the U.S. at bay during the early stages of what would escalate into the Napoleonic Wars. Hamilton asserted that Article II vests the president with “the executive power,” encompassing all federal executive powers unless explicitly shared with other offices, such as for appointments or treaties.

As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in his memorable dissent in Morrison v. Olson, the vesting clause of Article II does not confer some executive power, but all executive power.

This foundational understanding supports the breadth of presidential power, particularly in Trump’s ongoing disputes over spending and personnel dismissals. The Take Care Clause obligates the president to ensure the faithful execution of federal law, which inherently requires command over all executive personnel, including cabinet officials and heads of agencies. The Supreme Court upheld this authority in Myers v. United States in 1926 and reaffirmed it in Seila Law v. CFPB in 2020, establishing the president’s right to dismiss Senate-confirmed officials, even those protected by statute.

Trump’s ambition to curtail USAID spending is rooted in this wellspring of executive authority. The absence of explicit power concerning foreign policy and national security does not negate the primary responsibility for these actions as laid out in the Constitution. The challenge of managing foreign policy necessitates the attributes of decisiveness and energy, as Hamilton emphasized. It would be inconceivable for the founders to predict the emergence of judicial disputes over the most pressing foreign policy dilemmas.

Opponents of Trump highlight their political vulnerabilities by seeking judicial intervention to address conflicts over spending and executive authority. The Constitution assigns Congress the role of addressing a president alleged to exceed his constitutional limits. Congress has the power to cut funding, withhold confirmations, reject legislation, or ultimately pursue impeachment of an executive who refuses to implement lawful spending programs. Following the loss of national elections, Democratic leaders have struggled to recognize the lack of genuine constitutional conflict between Congress and the president.

A Republican-controlled Congress, aligned with Trump’s objectives, endorses efforts to trim the federal government, curb spending, and reduce the workforce.

The Supreme Court must heed the limited scope of its authority in moderating the president’s control over the executive branch and his formulation of foreign and national security policies.