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President Donald Trump’s bold decision to strike at three major Iranian nuclear sites leads to two pressing questions: How will the Iranian public respond to these actions, and will they ultimately facilitate regime change in the country?
While definitive answers to these questions may take time to surface, there is historical evidence that offers valuable insights into possible outcomes.
It is essential to understand the context surrounding these actions. One noteworthy historical precedent can inform our understanding of the current situation, particularly my own experience during the crisis in Serbia over two decades ago.
During my tenure in the Bill Clinton administration, I played a crucial role in advising the State Department on the unfolding events in Serbia. My mission involved empowering the Serbian opposition to challenge President Slobodan Milosevic.
At that time, many believed that the NATO bombings lasting 80 days and the Kosovo war in 1999 had solidified support for Milosevic. Contrary to that belief, my polling indicated a starkly different reality.
Despite the regime’s efforts to project an image of strength, the polls clearly reflected that Milosevic was extremely unpopular, with a staggering 70% unfavorable rating.
This data, recognized in major publications, guided strategic initiatives that ultimately led to the downfall of a regime many deemed invulnerable.
Remarkably, striking parallels emerge between Milosevic’s downfall and the current plight of the Khamenei regime in Iran.
In both cases, some skeptics argue that foreign airstrikes will provoke a resurgence of nationalist feelings in favor of an unpopular administration that desperately seeks to maintain an illusion of public approval.
Moreover, in Serbia, widespread discontent arose from economic woes. Similarly, in Iran, there exists profound dissatisfaction with the regime’s continued economic mismanagement.
While polls inside Iran are limited, research conducted by Stasis, a firm specializing in surveys within the region, provides some relevant insights. Their recent findings revealed that 78% of Iranians attribute the nation’s economic struggles to the government’s policies.
Furthermore, a significant demographic proportion—over 60%—is under the age of 30. This younger segment of the population expressed concerns, with 77% believing that their future prospects in Iran are bleak.
These factors highlight that like Milosevic’s regime, the Iranian government may appear to enjoy support on the surface, but the undercurrents reveal significant vulnerability.
For many observers, the idea that Israel—or particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—could catalyze regime change in Iran may seem implausible.
However, a closer examination of both the current dynamics and recent history reveals strong support for this hypothesis.
Looking back, there have been ten separate nationwide protests in Iran since 2009, involving millions who have taken to the streets against the government. Each protest arose from various grievances, such as blatant election fraud and the recent outcry over the death of Mahsa Amini, reflecting widespread resentment toward the current regime.
Much like my observations in Serbia, the persistence of protests across diverse issues indicates a robust opposition, capable of mobilizing effectively under the right conditions.
Unlike my experience in Serbia, where we needed to actively organize opposition efforts, Iran already exhibits significant readiness to rise against the regime.
The disappointing future facing the youth of Iran, coupled with the regime’s oppressive laws towards women, has fostered an environment ripe for insurrection. Approximately 44 million women in Iran are effectively treated as second-class citizens, having little to lose in a potential uprising.
Deep resentment toward the regime also manifests in public sentiment. Reports from Iranian news outlets disclose that some citizens have even expressed gratitude towards Netanyahu for his stance against the regime. Letters have circulated that reveal feelings of renewed optimism among Iranians regarding the prospect of regime change.
Currently, the ongoing discourse surrounding the potential for regime change reveals two schools of thought.
On one hand, figures like Netanyahu, former National Security Advisor John Bolton, and Yorktown Institute President Seth Cropsey contend that the present moment represents the most favorable opportunity for regime change in Iran since the 1979 revolution.
They argue that the widespread anti-regime sentiment among the populace could facilitate a united uprising against the government if the regime’s military structures are dismantled.
Conversely, critics, including French President Emmanuel Macron, remain skeptical. The fear of past failures in Iraq and Libya leads Macron to warn that attempts at regime change would bring chaos.
Some dissenters believe that Israel’s military actions might further entrench nationalism within Iran, fostering support for the regime.
It is crucial to acknowledge the merits of both arguments. However, based on my experiences in Serbia, it appears that those advocating for intervention have more compelling evidence.
The Iranian government is in a precarious position, having lost significant control following devastating military actions that have dismantled much of its command structure.
Unlike the scenarios in Libya and Iraq, Iran possesses an organized opposition that fosters a greater sense of national unity. This background strengthens the argument that the regime could indeed fall, especially given Israel’s targeted approach to limit civilian casualties while directly addressing the regime’s military capabilities.
Of course, the risks associated with pursuing regime change cannot be overlooked. There remains no assurance that a new government would align with Western interests—it could lead to a regime that poses even greater challenges.
Yet, failing to recognize the potential for change is equally detrimental. Historical precedents illustrate that when oppressed peoples confront their governments with confidence, even minimal support, the outcomes don’t necessarily lead to chaos or the continuation of existing authorities.
As seen in both Iran and Serbia, extensive bombing campaigns have initially increased complexity. However, they can also rally the opposition and contribute to the downfall of tyrannical leaders like Milosevic. In Iran, history suggests that similar dynamics could weaken an already fragile regime and provide a vital outlet for the millions clamoring for greater freedom and peace.
