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Recent developments have escalated tensions between the United States and China. China has firmly rejected President Donald Trump’s invitation to engage in discussions regarding nuclear arms reductions. In a provocative move, Beijing also unveiled advanced weaponry during its World War II parade, an event attended by notable figures such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un.
The parade displayed a range of sophisticated technologies, with nuclear delivery systems taking center stage. The Chinese military showcased a comprehensive triad of enhanced capabilities, including silo-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
Three years ago, Chinese officials claimed that the nation was not rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities. Fu Cong, who was the director-general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s arms control department in 2022, previously asserted that China maintained only a minimum deterrent necessary for self-defense.
This minimum deterrent strategy relies on the belief that a country needs enough nuclear weapons to survive an initial strike while having the ability to threaten destructive retaliation. Yet, the specific number of weapons required for such a strategy remains unclear, though typically, it suggests a modest force.
Moreover, China continues to uphold its no-first-use policy. Under this doctrine, China pledges not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against another country but rather to respond to an attack. While this policy theoretically aligns with its purported minimum deterrent strategy, China’s burgeoning nuclear investments contradict these claims.
In a 2019 statement, former STRATCOM Commander Admiral Charles Richard emphasized the importance of monitoring Chinese actions rather than statements. He referred to China’s military trajectory as a ‘strategic breakout,’ indicating that military exercises with Russia had become increasingly frequent, heightening concerns over China’s rapid military expansion.
China’s nuclear force is expanding swiftly, diversifying its delivery systems, which poses a significant challenge to the U.S. deterrent strategy. The U.S. nuclear deterrent is currently positioned to address one major nuclear power, but not two simultaneously.
Admiral Richard concluded that while Xi Jinping’s strategic thinking about the nuclear force is uncertain, what’s critical is that China is building capabilities that support a variety of nuclear employment strategies. This capability enhances China’s military potential for coercion.
For any coercive action to succeed, a nation must convince its adversary that it possesses both the capability and the willingness to strike. China is diligently developing a formidable nuclear arsenal that can target U.S. naval forces, bases, and allies, integrating its nuclear and conventional weapons into dual-capable systems. Analysts suggest that China’s nuclear ambitions are linked to potential plans to exert control over Taiwan by 2027.
A 2024 report from the Department of Defense indicated that China’s nuclear arsenal includes various missiles, ranging from low-yield precision strike options to intercontinental ballistic missiles with significant yield capabilities. This wide-ranging arsenal provides Beijing with options across the escalation spectrum.
The Department of Defense estimated that by 2030, China could have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads, much of which may be maintained at higher readiness levels. The stated goal is to ensure that the People’s Liberation Army is ‘basically complete’ by 2035, marking a crucial milestone on Xi’s path to achieving a world-class military by 2049.
The report also suggested that China may utilize fast breeder reactors and reprocessing technologies to produce plutonium for its nuclear arsenal. Taiwan’s recent assertions of maintaining a minimum deterrent and advocating a no-first-use policy have been called into question, as officials assert these technologies are for peaceful purposes.
Amid China’s military parade, Admiral Richard provided insights on the need for vigilance. He remarked that the rapid advancements across all military facets indicate a design oriented towards aggression. Festering concerns in the nuclear expert community have prompted calls for urgent modernization and adaptation of the U.S. nuclear forces to address emerging threats from China.
Despite widespread acknowledgment of this urgency, key policymakers at the Pentagon have yet to fully appreciate the changing landscape. For instance, the Biden administration has not undertaken sufficient measures to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities are robust enough to counter threats from both China and Russia.
To strengthen peace efforts, several critical actions should be taken by the Trump administration. First, there must be full modernization of nuclear delivery systems. This includes updating warheads and enhancing nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure. Additionally, the existing nuclear enterprise infrastructure requires substantial upgrading.
The estimated cost for this modernization remains open to debate, but some projections suggest it could amount to approximately 7 percent of the national defense budget, a budget that is already less than 4 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product. From a prevention standpoint, this investment could prove invaluable.
Second, it is imperative to formally terminate the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia before its expiration in February 2026, given Russia’s announced non-compliance amid the Ukraine conflict. Remaining bound by this treaty, while lacking transparency from Russia and facing an unrestrained China, would severely limit U.S. strategic flexibility at a time of heightened need.
Trump’s earlier withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty exemplified the wisdom of reassessing treaties when violated. The same reasoning applies to the New START treaty in present circumstances.
The third step involves bolstering nuclear deterrence capabilities in the Pacific by fast-tracking the deployment of the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N). This program was initiated during Trump’s first term and is crucial for adding flexibility and diversity to U.S. nuclear strategies.
The Biden administration’s slow endorsement of this initiative contributed to delays that can no longer be afforded. With the renewed tempo of Chinese aggression, expedited delivery of this critical capability becomes imperative for U.S. defense strategies.
Additionally, the next-generation bomber, the B-21, will serve as a key element in assuring allies and deterring China. Its predecessor, the B-2, provided significant advantages against high-value targets, reinforcing the importance of stealth technology in modern warfare. The U.S. Air Force plans to manufacture 100 B-21s, but expanding production capabilities could enhance defense readiness and significantly lower unit costs.
The narratives propagated by China about maintaining a minimum deterrence strategy, upholding a no-first-use commitment, and focusing on peaceful nuclear technologies have proven unfounded. For the sake of global security, the United States must intensify efforts to enhance the credibility of its nuclear deterrence effectively and immediately.
