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During a recent address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Donald Trump urged Congress to impose a cap on credit card interest rates, suggesting a limit of 10 percent. This echoes a proposal previously put forward by Senator Bernie Sanders. While such measures may appear appealing to many Americans, their popularity does not equate to sound economic policy.
As a former Chief Economist at the Office of Management and Budget under President Trump, I feel a deep sense of disappointment regarding this shift towards Senator Sanders’ economic agenda. The success of the Trump administration’s early economic policy relied heavily on free-market principles, including deregulation and fostering competition, which ultimately expanded access, reduced costs, and facilitated robust growth. By now endorsing price controls on credit, this current stance starkly contrasts with the administration’s past achievements and aligns uncomfortably with a more socialist economic playbook.
Historically, price controls on credit have led to detrimental outcomes. It is the lower-income borrowers with less-than-perfect credit histories who are most likely to feel the brunt of these policies, as they require access to credit.
The economic distress felt by millions of Americans is not unfounded. With inflation, rising prices, and stagnant wages causing significant financial pressure, the urgency to act is palpable. However, layering poor policy decisions on an already struggling economy may exacerbate existing challenges.
Credit card companies determine interest rates based on the perceived risk associated with lending to various borrowers. When lenders cannot set rates that accurately reflect the risk of defaults, they often resort to reducing or eliminating lending to higher-risk individuals.
Consider the practical implications of implementing a cap at 10 percent. The average annual percentage rate (APR) for credit cards currently hovers around 20 percent, yet this figure conceals significant disparities among different borrower categories. Prime borrowers can secure rates as low as 14 percent, while those with a subprime rating may face rates exceeding 25 percent. These elevated rates correlate with real-world lending risks, as some borrowers default at rates that are five times higher than others. Enforcing a 10 percent cap would not eliminate the inherent risks; rather, it would prevent lenders from incorporating these risks into their pricing models.
As a result, numerous Americans could find themselves effectively excluded from the credit market altogether.
The American Bankers Association projects that such a cap could restrict access to credit for at least 137 million cardholders. These individuals often require credit to manage emergencies, bridge financial gaps between paychecks, or build their credit histories. With price controls in place, many of these consumers would be forced toward high-cost alternatives such as payday lenders or unregulated loan sharks, which charge exorbitant rates beyond any form of oversight.
This scenario is not merely theoretical. Historical evidence shows us the consequences of similar policies. Interest rate caps employed in the 1970s resulted in a significant decrease in consumer credit availability, only reversing after a Supreme Court decision allowed interstate banking. In France, stringent usury laws have effectively created a permanent underclass devoid of legal access to credit. In Japan, the introduction of rate caps in 2006 contributed to the downfall of the consumer finance sector and pushed vulnerable borrowers toward organized crime.
Furthermore, assertions that such policies might mitigate excessive profits do not hold up under scrutiny. Although credit card issuers may operate on narrow margins, the high nominal rates often mask the substantial risks involved in lending. For instance, JPMorgan Chase’s credit card segment reported an impressive but not excessive 27 percent return on equity in recent years. This figure, while healthy, reflects the genuine risks inherent in the credit market.
Instead of resorting to price caps, policymakers should focus on encouraging competition and enhancing financial literacy among consumers. By removing barriers to entry for new financial institutions, mandating clearer disclosures for credit terms, and fostering alternative lending options such as credit-builder loans or secured credit cards, we could actually increase access to credit rather than constrain it.
The initial Trump administration recognized the importance of letting market forces work. This approach yielded tangible benefits for consumers. Transitioning to interest rate caps and fee limitations will not cultivate a more compassionate economy; instead, it risks restricting financial opportunities for those who need them the most.
Politicians advocating for a crackdown on credit card companies through rate caps may underestimate the realities of economic principles. Much like the laws of physics, economic laws remain uncompromising regardless of legislative action. The individuals facing the steepest consequences will be those already financially vulnerable, learning too late that a high-interest credit card they can access often bears more value than an unreachable low-rate option.
The path to exclusion from financial systems often unwinds from well-meaning intentions. Instead of paving this road, let us embrace solutions that foster economic growth while implementing market-driven strategies that have shown effective results in the past.